Lessons From Globalisation

What did we miss about globalisation? In an early 2019 lecture, American economist Paul Krugman presented his views on several characteristics about globalisation that we have observed and missed over time. Krugman emphasises the need for greater discourse on globalisation in relation to the dynamics of change, short run effects, social and distributional impacts, and the interactions with the political economy. A brief outline on some of his views are summarised as follows:

What were we learning about globalisation?

Cycles and levels: We can think about several major eras of globalisation: (1) Introduction of steamships and railroads for global trade; (2) The disentanglement of protectionist policies and attitudes; (3) Technological enablers that reduced transaction and control costs; and (4) Integration of new entrants over time, such as China and Bangladesh. Krugman highlights Bangladesh in particular as an interesting case study, noting that the country was once at the brink of a Malthusian crisis before its integration with global markets. The world was actually quite globalised prior to World War I but declined between World War I and World War II. A big revival took place afterwards, but not without significant cyclical swings. Trade policies appear to cycle between free trade and protectionism depending on popular and political attitudes at the time (evident today too in our current political climate).

Distributional effects: Trade was expected to have large effects on distribution and income, as trade should produce winners and losers. Surprisingly, global trade effects after World War II had less distributional impacts than expected. This reflected the advantages of scale and suggests that the efficiency gains did not impact distributions negatively. However, a law or observation in economics and finance is that once you explain how the world works – the theory will likely change . For instance, the rise of US manufacture export and import levels from 1913-1992, and reversal from 1992-2016 has had high distributional impacts. Trade between low and high wage countries can affect the distribution of income, particularly for those without education, due to reallocation of trade, capital and income flows. The income distribution effects of trade are now larger.

What did we miss about globalisation?

Impact of pace change: Infrastructure, policy and related levers of economic production often did not keep pace with globalisation or change in general. Economists will most likely never know how reality might settle in equilibrium. The impact of change is often more dramatic, interesting and important than the ‘final’ level. Job displacement effects were large and the downsides larger than anticipated. Governments and economists did not think deeply about the dynamics and transitions from rapid change.

Economic geography: Trade theory often did not think about how the location of activities fit within the narrative of trade. Production tends to cluster and localise due to specialisation benefits, spillovers and production costs. Clusters create isolated risks to natural disasters, policy shocks and other discrete events. While the aggregate effect of free trade is usually positive, the variance in regional and local experiences can be positive or negative. Short term, large-scale disruptions help explain the political economy backlash to globalisation and trade today. Stories matter more than numbers.

Fragility of trade: History demonstrates the impact that one or several groups of leaders can have on market confidence, firm production and trade flows. The economics of world trade might look to protect itself more from the whims of individuals in the future. A lot of diplomacy is involved in the arrangements of free trade agreements. It is sometimes less about economic prosperity and more about political objectives (e.g. establish new alliances, suppress competing political institutions, etc.). Government views on policy often do not derive from coherent economic analysis.

Herd mentality: United States public opinion data for example shows that republicans have swung between pro- and anti- stances towards free trade on numerous occasions. It suggests that the public has no real opinion on international trade policy and that they are following the directives of their preferred candidate. It suggests as well that effective communication of economic and policy decisions (and its tradeoffs) is critical to building thoughtful public concensus.

Subtle case: The case for free trade is usually more subtle and political than originally thought to be. Global trade benefits from comparative advantages, economies of scale, and increasing returns afforded through international and technological specialisation. However, while trade is not a zero-sum game, it also does not imply that free trade is optimal policy. This is because market imperfections and distortions exist. At the same time, public intervention might not necessarily be any better. Optimal trade policy is difficult to achieve due to the complexity of market structures and participants, and the strategic responses of governments involved. The opportunity cost and trade-offs between efficiency, effectiveness and equity are not always clear. Do we truly experience a net gain from trade-wars?

Reference

Krugman, P. (2019). What did we miss about globalisation? Corden Public Lecture, The University of Melbourne.

Krugman, P. (1993). The narrow and broad arguments for free trade. American Economic Review, 83(2), 362.

Further Reading